Saving Mickey Mouse: The Upcoming Fight FOR Copyright Term Extension In 2018 by Bernaski, Kaitlyn Rose
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2014
Saving Mickey Mouse: The Upcoming Fight FOR
Copyright Term Extension In 2018
Kaitlyn Rose Bernaski
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Bernaski, Kaitlyn Rose, "Saving Mickey Mouse: The Upcoming Fight FOR Copyright Term Extension In 2018" (2014). Law School
Student Scholarship. 439.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/439
  
SAVING MICKEY MOUSE: THE UPCOMING FIGHT FOR COPYRIGHT TERM 
EXTENSION IN 2018 
 
Kaitlyn Bernaski 
 
Seton Hall University School of Law 
 
Abstract 
 
This article argues that copyright terms should be extended again in 2018, when the 
current copyright statute calls for some copyrighted works of film, music, and literature to start 
entering the public domain, and when Congress is to decide on the future of copyright term 
extension.  Term extension has been a hot topic among copyright owners for years, and lobbying 
efforts by copyright owners have pushed terms to be extended in 1831, 1909, 1976, and in 1998.  
Proponents of extension argue that additional protection incentivizes copyright owners to 
restore older works, disseminate them to the public, and continue to create new works.  A fear 
exists that works in the public domain will be tarnished and exploited.  Those who argue against 
copyright term extension claim that current copyright protection is more than sufficient to 
protect copyright’s purpose of encouraging  creativity and unfairly grants the author a 
monopoly on his copyright for an extensive amount of time.  
 
This article explores the copyright extension battle, particularly through the involvement 
of the Disney Corporation, a major proponent and lobbyist of copyright extension through the 
years.  It reviews related Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate the procedural history of 
copyright term extension.  This article traces Disney’s participation in the successful fight to 
extend copyrights, as well as the expected lobbying efforts of copyright owners as 2018 
approaches.  It also analyzes the arguments for extension and for copyright reform, and what 
either decision would mean for copyright owners, focusing on the effect changes would have on 
large-quantity copyright holders such as Disney.  Finally, the article concludes that Congress 
should grant copyright extension in 2018 by taking various measures, and particularly for 
copyrights that are still in use by their respective authors.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In October 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) was signed 
into law, granting copyright owners extended copyright terms in various ways for older works, 
new works, and works of corporate authorship.
1
  One noteworthy provision included increasing 
the duration of copyright protection for works published before January 1, 1978 for an additional 
                                                 
1
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2003) (explaining the passage of the Copyright Extension Act 
of 1998).   
 1 
  
twenty years.
2
  This meant that copyright owners of older works would have copyright protection 
until 2018, when Congress will inevitably face a similar debate of whether terms should be 
extended again.
3
  The Disney Corporation was heavily involved as a proponent of term 
extension, as Mickey Mouse and some of Disney’s other prominent copyrights would have 
entered the public domain without passage of the 1998 Act.
4
  As 2018 draws closer, the battle for 
copyright term extension is expected to reignite, and term extension should be granted again, as 
copyright owners should reap the benefits of their contributions to society, and future works 
continuously need to be incentivized.  
 This article explores the long-debated issue of copyright term extension, and why 
copyright terms should be altered and extended.  Part II examines the long history of the 
copyright term extension battle.  The change in copyright terms over the years will be discussed, 
from the Copyright Act of 1790, Copyright Act of 1831, Copyright Act of 1909, and Copyright 
Act of 1976, along with more recent modifications to copyright terms.  
In 1998, Disney faced the loss of their arguably most-famous copyright, Mickey Mouse, 
and thus began their participation as one of the prominent lobbyists for copyright term 
extension.
5
  Part III examines Disney’s involvement in the most recent fight for extended 
copyright terms.  In 2018, Disney, and many other copyright owners, will face the same problem 
and will most likely lobby extensively for another term extension.
6
  Disney should undoubtedly 
push for another law along the lines of CTEA to further the duration of their copyright terms.   
                                                 
2
 Id.  
3
 Laurie Richter, Reproductive Freedom: Striking A Fair Balance Between Copyright and Other Intellectual 
Property Protections in Cartoon Characters, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 441, 451 (2009) (“In just two (2) years, Disney 
spent more than $6.3 million on the cause, and it appears to have paid off since the result was the creation of the 
CTEA.”).  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id.  
6
  Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 383 (2000) (“Due 
to the enactment of the CTEA, no new works will fall into the public domain until the year 2018.”) 
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Part IV examines the Act in detail, starting with its introduction in the Senate on March 
20, 1997.
7
  Those in favor of the bill argued that term extension was necessary due to increased 
human life expectancy, longer copyright terms in Europe that the United States needed to match 
to simplify the international entertainment industry, and to encourage the creation of works that 
would otherwise not be produced under the existing limited copyright terms.
8
  Opponents argued 
that term extensions were not necessary to promote the progress of science and the useful arts 
and that most works receive the majority of the profits that they will make within the first few 
years of creation.
9
  Despite this opposition, the Act passed the Senate and the House on October 
7, 1998, and was signed into law by President Clinton on October 27, 1998.
10
 
 Following the passage of the Act in 1998, the opponents to copyright extension continued 
their fight, all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
11
  Part V examines the case of Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, in which the Court decided upon a challenge to the Act based on constitutional 
grounds.  The challenge was based on the argument that the Constitution’s Copyright Clause 
gives Congress the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts by granting 
copyrights for limited times.
12
  The Court sided with the proponents of term extension, holding 
that the twenty-year term extension did not violate the Copyright Clause, mostly based on the 
interpretation that the Clause intended Congress to set a limit for copyright terms – but no 
constitutional restriction exists for how long that limit can be.
13
   
                                                 
7
 S. 505 (105
th
): Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 105
th
 Congress, 1997-1998. 
8
 Yemi Adeyanju, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act: A Violation of Progress and Promotion of the 
Arts, 2003 SYRACUSE L. & TECH. J. 3.  (2003).   
9
 Id.   
10
 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
11
 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.  
12
 Id. at 186. 
13
 Id. at 189.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8 
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 While the copyright term extension battle has been silenced for a number of years, as 
2018 grows closer, the arguments for and against further term extension will inevitably begin 
again.  Part VI will analyze the benefits of copyright term extension and the argument for further 
extension, as well as the pitfalls of term extension, and explain why terms should be altered and 
extended again in 2018.  Copyright terms should be extended for a number of reasons in 2018, 
including the fact that people are living longer and should be able to enjoy the fruits of their 
labor, companies are existing longer, and there is more of a possibility now than ever before for 
inferior copies of copyrighted works to be made and distributed with modern technology.   
 Part VII suggests how copyright terms should be extended and altered to further protect 
authors of copyrighted works.  While creators currently receive a certain amount and duration of 
protection, many copyrighted works that would potentially enter the public domain soon are still 
used by the companies or authors who created them, and for a large profit.  In modern times, 
where companies, as well as people, are enduring longer and there is more access and 
dissemination of works, there is a serious need for copyright protection – and for it to be a 
lengthy protection.  The Supreme Court has already held that the Constitution does not state what 
limit must be placed on copyrights, but just that there needs to be a limit of some sort.
14
  By 
taking certain measures, Congress can ensure that copyright owners and the public receive the 
best result.   
 Part VIII concludes, summarizing the evolution of the copyright term extension battle 
and the likely future of it, and how copyright protection should be expanded to further the goals 
of copyright law.  
II. HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION BATTLE 
 
                                                 
14
 Id.  
 4 
  
 The Copyright Term extension battle has waged for years, with copyright statutes 
changing multiple times, always extending terms.  The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first 
statute that provided for specific copyright terms.
15
  In 1831, the first general revision to the Act 
of 1790 was enacted, extending copyright terms.
16
  Decades later, the Copyright Act of 1909 
amended and consolidated previous copyright statutes.
17
  Lastly, the current statute is the 
Copyright Act of 1976, which was later amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and 
the Copyright Term Extension Act.
18
  Through the years, copyright terms have been altered as an 
ever-changing part of our laws. 
 The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first copyright statute in the United States.
19
  The Act 
provided a copyright term lasting fourteen years from the date of publication.
20
  That term was 
then renewable for an additional fourteen years, but only if the work’s author survived the first 
term.
21
  This renewable term applied to works that were already published, works that had been 
created but were not published, and future works, and certain formality requirements were 
created for copyrights.
22
  This Act marked the first time that works would be protected under 
copyright.  
 In 1831, the Copyright Act was amended for the first time.
23
  The original copyright term 
was extended from fourteen years to twenty eight years from the date of publication, with an 
option to renew the copyright for another fourteen years.
24
  Also, musical compositions became 
                                                 
15
 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act). 
16
 See Act of Feb. 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).   
17
 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).  
18
 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.  
19
 See 1 Stat. 124.   
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id.  
23
 See Act of Feb. 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).   
24
 Victoria A. Grzelak, Mickey Mouse & Sonny Bono Go to Court: The Copyright Term Extension Act and Its Effect 
on Current and Future Rights, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 99 (2002) (discussing the 1831 Act).  
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statutorily protected works.
25
  Furthermore, the statute of limitations on copyright actions was 
increased from one to two years, and formality requirements were altered.
26
  The Copyright Act 
of 1831 marked the first of a handful of amendments to the Act.  
 The next major revision of the Copyright Act occurred in 1909.
27
  Copyright terms were 
maintained at twenty-eight years from publication, but the renewable term of protection was 
extended from fourteen years to twenty-eight years.
28
  This Act also created two systems of 
copyright protection.
29
  State laws protect unpublished works, and original, published works with 
a notice of copyright affixed would be protected under federal copyright law.
30
  If a published 
work did not have a notice of copyright affixed, the work would not be protected and would 
enter the public domain.
31
  The public domain contains the “facts, ideas, and concepts which 
cannot be protected by copyright.”32  These changes in 1909 created a growing evolvement of 
copyright law.  
 The Copyright Act was next amended in 1976, and this version, with some slight 
changes, remains in effect today.
33
  Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection 
extends to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known 
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”34  Works of authorship include literary 
works, musical works (and accompanying words), dramatic works (and accompanying music), 
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures 
                                                 
25
 1 Patry on Copyright § 1:23 (discussing the 1831 Act).  
26
 Id.  
27
 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (Mar. 4, 1909; repealed Jan. 1, 1978).  
28
 1 Patry on Copyright § 1:45 (detailing the 1909 Act).  
29
 Id.  
30
 Id. 
31
 Id.  
32
 17 U.S.C. § 107(b) (2007).   
33
 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).  
34
 Id.  
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and other audiovisual works, and sound recordings.
35
  Copyright holders are granted five 
exclusive rights: the right to reproduce their work, to create derivative works, to distribute copies 
by sale, lease, or rental, to perform the work publicly, and to display the work publicly.
36
  Under 
this amendment, the fair use defense to copyright was codified for the first time.
37
  Copyrighted 
works are permitted to be used for criticism, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research 
purposes, and other purposes.
38
  Very importantly, this Act increased the copyright term to the 
life of the author plus fifty years after the author’s death.39  Anonymous works, pseudonymous 
works, and works made for hire enjoy seventy-five years of protection.
40
  For works published 
before 1978 that had not entered the public domain already, seventy-five years of protection was 
also granted.
41
  Also, the requirements of registration, deposit, and renewing to maintain 
copyright were abolished.
42
  This version of the Act prevails today, with some changes made to it 
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Copyright Term Extension Act.
43
   
 In 1998, Congress extended the duration of copyright protection by twenty years.
44
  
Therefore, most copyrights now last from creation until seventy years after the author’s death.45  
Works created between 1923 and 1978 enjoy ninety-five years of copyright protection.
46
  The 
extended term applies to existing and future copyrights.
47
  This current copyright term extension 
                                                 
35
 Id. 
36
 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
37
 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
38
 Id.    
39
 17 U.S.C. § 302.   
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. 
42
 Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law (6
th
 ed. 2003), 22-27.   
43
 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.   
44
 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).   
45
 Id.   
46
 17 U.S.C. §§302-304 (2011).   
47
 Id.at 770-771.  
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therefore is set to expire in 2018, when Congress will be faced with the same decision again of 
whether to extend copyright terms further.
48
   
III. DISNEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE 
 Historically, the Disney Corporation has been extremely protective of their copyrights 
and has been a prominent proponent of copyright term extension.  The company has gone so far 
previously as to sue three Florida day care centers that each featured a painting of Mickey Mouse 
as part of their indoor décor.
49
  Disney also threatened to sue when the 1989 Oscar awards 
featured a parody of Snow White movie in the opening number of the broadcast.
50
  Therefore, it 
was not surprising when Disney was heavily involved in the fight for copyright term extension in 
the late 1990s.   
 Disney became involved in the term extension battle because the company faced the 
possibility of losing protection for an integral part of their intellectual property, their Mickey 
Mouse character.  Mickey Mouse was created by Walt Disney in 1928, and appeared in three 
feature films that year.
51
  Mickey Mouse has served as the ultimate symbol of Disney, and by the 
time copyright term extension was debated in 1998, the copyright on Mickey Mouse earned 
about $8 billion per year between Disney’s consumer products and theme parks.52  With the 
whopping revenue that Mickey Mouse brings in for Disney annually, Disney was naturally 
strongly invested in the extension of copyright terms.  
 Disney took major steps to lobby for copyright term extension in 1998.  Michael Eisner, 
the chairman of Disney in 1998, personally met with Trent Lott, the Senate Majority Leader at 
                                                 
48
 Richter, supra note 3, at 451.  
49
 Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & 
SPORTS L. REV. 429 (Spring 1994).  
50
 Id. at 435.   
51
 Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and the Copyright Act of 
1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254, 255 (Spring 2003). 
52
 Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 292 (2002).    
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that time to discuss the situation.
53
  Disney created a Disney Political Action Committee that 
heavily donated to the senator’s campaign chests.54  After Lott became a co-sponsor of CTEA, 
Disney donated to his campaign, and contributed to eighteen of the bill’s sponsors in both 
Houses.
55
  It is estimated that Disney contributed more than $800,000 to the reelection 
campaigns of these sponsors of CTEA.
56
  Disney’s major moves towards copyright extension 
were successful, as CTEA was signed into law.   
IV. THE 1998 SONNY BONO COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT 
 On October 27, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 into law.
57
  Due to CTEA, no published copyrighted work will enter the 
public domain until January 1, 2019.
58
  CTEA brought numerous changes to the copyright law in 
existence at the time of CTEA’s passage.  Under the CTEA, works created after January 1, 1978 
receive copyright protection for the life of the author plus seventy years.
59
  For anonymous 
works, pseudonymous works and “works made for hire,” ninety-five years of protection would 
be enjoyed from first publication, or one hundred and twenty years of protection from creation.
60
  
For works that were already in their renewal term at the time the Act became effective, copyright 
protection was altered to include ninety-five years of protection from the date the copyright was 
originally secured.
61
  
                                                 
53
 Id.  
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr., Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 824 (2008).  
57
 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 364 (2000).  
58
 Id.   
59
 17 U.S.C. §302(a) (2003).  
60
 Patrick H. Haggerty, The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN. 
REV. 651, 659 (2002). 
61
 Id.  
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 Proponents for CTEA argued that a longer copyright term creates a greater incentive for 
authors to create more works.
62
  Since granting an author a limited monopoly creates incentive 
for authors to produce works, extending that monopoly would further incentivize creativity and 
the production of original works.
63
  Making the process more appealing and rewarding for 
authors can only help stimulate new, original works, which undoubtedly benefits the public who 
gets the opportunity to enjoy and experience these works.  
 Further, proponents of the CTEA purport that copyright terms should be long enough to 
not only benefit the author, but for future heirs of the author.
64
  With modern times has come 
expanded life expectancies and expanded commercial longevity of works.
65
  Advocates have 
purported that terms should be long enough to protect the author and two succeeding generations 
of heirs.  The lobbying efforts of companies like Disney paid off, as the Act was enacted.  
V.  THE SUPREME COURT DECISION OF ELDRED V. ASHCROFT  
Eric Eldred, a retired programmer and founder of an online press, served as the plaintiff 
for the constitutional challenge to the CTEA.
66
  Eldred’s “Eldritch Press” was an international 
electronic library that made public domain books available on the internet for anyone to enjoy.
67
  
Over 20,000 people worldwide would log on to the website daily to read the works he made 
available.
68
  After passage of the CTEA, Eldred’s plans to expand the library came to a halt, as 
no new public domain material would be available until 2019.
69
  Professor Lawrence Lessig of 
Harvard University learned of Eldred, and thought he would be a good choice for the plaintiff in 
                                                 
62
 Adeyanju, supra note 4, citing Orrin Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn 
of the Millennium, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 733-34 (1998).   
63
 Id.  
64
 Id.  
65
 Id. 
66
 Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 293 (2002). 
67
 Id.  
68
 Id.  
69
 Id.  
 10 
  
a case challenging the law.
70
  Eldred agreed to be a part of the suit, and joined Lessig’s effort to 
change the law.
71
  
Eldred and nine other co-plaintiffs, each with services involving works from the public 
domain, challenged the CTEA as unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause’s “limited times” 
specification and the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.
72
  The petitioners argued 
that “limited time” in effect when a copyright begins is “the constitutional boundary, a clear line 
beyond the power of Congress to extend.”73  Petitioners also argued that the CTEA is a “content-
neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny” for such 
regulations.
74
  These constitutional challenges to the CTEA proved to be unsuccessful in the 
three lower courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States.
75
  
The case went through the trial court, the District of Columbia Circuit court, the Court of 
Appeals, and the Supreme Court.
76
  The trial court held that the “limited times” constitutional 
limit is not violated because while the CTEA extended copyright terms from the limits of the 
1976 Act, the terms are still limited, rather than perpetual, and “therefore fit within Congress’ 
discretion.”77  Also, the court held that “there are no First Amendment rights to use the 
copyrighted works of others.”78  The circuit court affirmed, as did the appellate court, 
emphasizing that nowhere in the constitutional text does it suggest that a copyright term is not 
                                                 
70
 Id.  
71
 Id.  
72
 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.  
73
 Id.  
74
 Id.  
75
 Id. at 186-187.   
76
 Id.  
77
 Id. at 186.   
78
 Id. 
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for a limited time if it may later be extended for another limited time.
79
  After the lower courts 
agreed, the Supreme Court heard the case in 2003, affirming the decision.
80
 
The Eldred majority emphasized the Court’s previous decisions of Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. and Graham v. John Deer Co. of Kansas City that held Congress can 
implement the “stated purposes of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best 
effectuates the constitutional aim.”81  The Court gave great deference to Congress, emphasizing 
that “the wisdom of Congress’ action … is not within our province to second-guess.”82  The 
Court seemed to move towards favoring rewarding the copyright owner, and away from their 
past belief of primarily promoting the public good, and providing public access to works.
83
  
Further acknowledging Congress’ broad powers in regards to copyright, the Court held that 
Congress has a “virtually unlimited power to restrict the flow of new material into the public 
domain.”84  Therefore, it was clear that the Court gave strong deference to Congress and that 
expanding copyright terms are acceptable, so long as the term does not become perpetual.  
However, the Court was unanimous in its belief that CTEA was an acceptable, 
constitutional law.
85
  Justice Stevens dissented; stressing that focusing on the compensation of 
authors frustrates the members of the public who wish to make use of a work in the free 
market.
86
  Furthermore, he felt that once a work is created, the need to encourage creation is 
                                                 
79
 Id.  
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. at Footnote 3 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Bonito Boats v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)).  
82
 Id. at 222.  
83
 David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority over Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft: Deference, 
Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1255, 1265 (2007) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that copyright law makes compensation to the 
author a secondary consideration); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (focused on 
the idea that copyright law serves the public good rather than the copyright owner).   
84
 Id. at 1266, citing Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 255-
56 (2002).   
85
 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241-244 (Dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer).  
86
 Id. at 226.  
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diminished.
87
  Stevens also believed that retroactive application of the CTEA would keep 
innumerable works out of the public domain, and that preventing the public domain from 
growing does not further the intent of the Copyright Clause.
88
  He believed that the majority had 
gone too far, that the Court had essentially stated that Congress’s actions under the Copyright 
Clause are judicially unreviewable.
89
  Justice Breyer also dissented, believing that the original 
grant of a monopoly adequately incentivizes authors to create new work.
90
  Breyer felt that 
extending the term of most copyrights to ninety-five years and many new copyrights to seventy 
years after the author’s death was essentially a perpetual grant of copyright, and therefore 
unconstitutional.
91
  He strongly felt that although Congress has broad power in regards to 
copyright, there are limits to that power, and that the CTEA over-stepped that boundary.
92
  
Therefore, despite the CTEA passing constitutional muster, not all of the justices appreciated the 
sweeping deference granted to Congress.
93
   
The outcome in Eldred gives hope that future fights for the expansion of copyright 
protection will be successful.  The Court bowed to Congress, permitting them to create copyright 
legislation as they saw fit, permitting that legislation is within constitutional boundaries.  Eldred 
suggests that future term expansion, as long as the expansion is not perpetual, could be 
constitutional. 
VI. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST COPYRIGHT EXTENSION 
 Many reasons have been put forth by experts, Congress, the courts, and copyright owners 
as to why copyright protection should be expanded or limited.  As 2018 draws closer, these 
                                                 
87
 Id.  
88
 Id. at 240-241.  
89
 Id. at 241. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. at 242-243.  
92
 Id.  
93
 Id. at 241-244.  
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arguments will undoubtedly be put forth again, as Congress will be faced with the decision of 
whether or not to extend copyright protection again.  Both sides of the argument have ample 
reasons as to why expanding or limiting copyright protection furthers the goals of copyright law, 
but the benefits of expanding protection outweighs any fear of limiting public access, and will 
incentivize authors to create new works for years. 
 The purpose of copyright law is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries."
94
  The preamble of this section, “to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts” illustrates that copyright law is more focused towards benefiting the public 
good, rather than compensating authors.
95
  The second part of the section, “by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries,” illustrates that while copyright law permits the grant of a monopoly to the author 
or inventor, it is to be for a limited time.
96
  By permitting a limited monopoly, the Framers could 
ensure that the public would benefit from works entering the public domain after the author’s 
“limited” exclusive ownership ceased.97  This language illustrates that creators are to be 
rewarded for a limited time, and the public is then to benefit from works entering the public 
domain – a benefit for both parties involved.98 
 In 17 U.S.C. §106, Congress outlined the exclusive rights that copyright owners are 
granted.
99
  Among other rights, copyright owners are permitted to reproduce their work, prepare 
                                                 
94
 U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8.   
95
 Id., Adeyanju, supra note 4 (explaining the intention of the Framer’s in creating the Copyright Clause). 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id.  
98
 Id.  
99
 17 U.S.C. §106. 
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derivative works based upon their copyrighted works, and distribute their copyrighted works.
100
  
These rights ensure that the creator can exclusively reproduce their work, build off their creation, 
and distribute their work in the way they choose.  The rights granted to copyright owners further 
the progress of science and the useful arts, as the Framers intended.
101
 
 The goals of copyright law can be attained while still expanding copyright protection.  As 
times change, the law needs to change accordingly, as has been evidenced by the amendments to 
the Copyright Act throughout the years.
102
  Proponents of extension argue that expanding 
protection will further incentivize the creation of works, that works will be grossly underused if 
they fall into the public domain, that other works will be overused and exploited upon entering 
the public domain, and that the hard work of copyright owners can be tarnished when their work 
enters the public domain.
103
  Proponents also claim that as times change and the life expectancy 
of people increase and the longevity of businesses grows as well, that copyright terms need to be 
extended.
104
  Proponents of CTEA believed that protection should benefit the author, and at least 
two future generations of the author’s heirs.105  These arguments present valid reasons as to why 
copyright terms should be expanded and the expansion of copyright terms for another, longer 
limited time, will not violate the constitution. 
 The most important argument for copyright extension is that in order to continue to 
incentivize creation, authors need to be incentivized adequately.  Longer copyright terms mean 
                                                 
100
 Id., Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of 
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 794 (explaining the main purposes of copyright law).  
101
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that the author, and his business or heirs, will exclusively enjoy the rewards of his work for a 
longer time, thus creating more of an incentive for him to create.
106
  Since life expectancies are 
increasing as time goes on, some argue that copyright should be extended, since the children and 
grandchildren of authors will outlive the current terms, and they deserve to reap the benefits of 
those who came before them, authors who want their descendants to benefit from their hard 
work.
107
  Besides people living longer, technological advances have naturally extended the 
commercial longevity of works.
108
  Companies can now grow into huge conglomerates that 
withstand the test of time for generations.  These changes over time mean that works can be 
exploited longer, and that they should be.
109
  Expanding copyright terms will therefore further 
incentivize creation, as authors will be reassured that their work will remain protected for a 
longer time.     
 The potential for works to be underused is also a concern for extension proponents.
110
  If 
current copyright owners know that their exclusive right to their work is limited, this can “lead to 
inefficiencies because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these 
works.”111  The creation of copyrighted works is often expensive.112  The maintenance or 
continued production of works can also be extremely costly.
113
  If terms are not long enough, 
creators cannot confidently know that they will be able to exclude others from copying their 
ideas, and therefore will refrain from creating in the fear that their investment will not be 
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recovered.
114
  That undoubtedly suppresses creativity in some capacity, therefore harming the 
public.  Copyright owners are granted the exclusive right to create derivative works from their 
creations.
115
  However, if terms are not extended, creators will not necessarily be incentivized to 
create subsequent derivative works based on their creation.
116
  While companies with long-term 
copyrights, such as Disney, have already recouped their investments long ago, they are still 
continuously investing in works featuring that copyright, and taking a copyright away 
prematurely therefore stifles creativity.  Just because a company has profited “enough” from a 
copyright is not grounds for releasing it to the public domain.  The potential for the underuse of 
current copyrights directly undermines the goal of progress, and is a rightful concern for 
expansion proponents. 
 When copyrights fall into the public domain, especially while they are still in active use, 
the gross overuse of the copyright is a realistic danger.
117
  Assuming that the value of creative 
works is finite, when a work falls into the public domain, “others will rush to exploit the work’s 
value immediately,” which is not always in the best interest of the public.118  Copyright owners 
should have the opportunity to exploit their own creations to the extent they chose to before the 
copyright is automatically seized by the public domain.
119
  If authors know that they are creating 
works for the benefit of the public domain rather than for the gain of their heirs, they could be 
disenchanted from putting in the time and effort to create.  By allowing works to fall into the 
public domain too soon, the work might not have hit its maximum value yet, despite being in 
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existence for a number of years, and the danger of overuse of copyrights by others is very real, 
and copyright owners stand to lose the benefits from the works they created.
120
  
 Similar to the idea of others overusing copyrights and making them lose value, is the idea 
that by allowing copyrighted works to enter the public domain, the copyright can easily become 
tarnished.
121
  Others are free to use the copyright, and can misuse and distort the copyright to 
their liking, very possibly tarnishing the original creation.
122
  This can reduce the value of the 
copyright, and ultimately harm social welfare.
123
  While some works created by others after a 
copyright enters the public domain will undoubtedly benefit society, the idea of taking a 
copyright that is in current use and tossing it into the public domain seems wrong.  Copyright 
law seeks to incentivize derivative works by the author who created the work, not by allowing 
others to have their way with a work in the public domain, ultimately tarnishing the original 
copyright.
124
  If consumers see a poor derivative work or an inappropriate use of a copyright, 
they potentially will be turned off from the original work, which harms the original author and 
can harm the public.
125
  
 However, the opponents of extension have their own ample arguments.  Opponents 
believe that terms do not need to be extended any further in the interest of incentivizing new or 
derivative works, and that it is not reasonable to think that a twenty year increase in copyright 
terms for works that have already been created can incentivize new work.
126
  Also, opponents to 
term extension argue that the increase in life expectancy argument of proponents is inadequate, 
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as current terms provide for a number of protected years after the death of the author, so the 
author benefits from exclusive use for the duration of his lifetime.
127
   
 Opponents argue that the idea of protecting the work during the author’s lifetime, and the 
lifetime of two generations after him is not an intention of copyright law.
128
  This intent to grant 
protection to the author’s heirs has never been expressly stated as a goal.129  While the desire of a 
creator to pass on the fruit of his labors is reasonable, it is too far to support a system that seeks 
to benefit descendants that the author did not even know.
130
  Also, the general public will be 
better off if the heirs of these hypothetical authors did something productive.
131
  
 Along the same lines of not wanting to protect the rights of future descendants, opponents 
disagree that terms should be extended as life expectancies are increasing.
132
  Opponents argue 
that since the current term framework provides for protection for seventy years after the author’s 
death, so the work will still be protected for a number of years.
133
  As life expectancies are 
increasing, the author will potentially live longer, and thus the term is automatically extended for 
that many more years.
134
  Opponents feel that since there is no right for two generations to 
benefit from copyright protection, that increased life expectancy is also not a legitimate reason to 
extend copyright protection.
135
  
 While proponents of copyright acknowledge that companies are surviving longer and that 
technological advances have made works commercially viable for longer periods, opponents 
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claim that copyright protection is a “bargained agreement between the government and the 
creators.  Copyright protection is not an inherent right, but a statutory creation of the 
government.”136  Opponents argue that authors know that their work will eventually fall into the 
public domain, and that this is a social bargain that exists in our society.
137
  
Opponents also believe that extension is a potential violation of the public trust 
doctrine.
138
  Since the public benefits from works entering the public domain, freezing the public 
domain for a certain number of years can constitute a wrongful taking of works that were going 
to enter the public domain and benefit the public.
139
  Opponents believe that this doctrine can be 
applied to copyright law and that freezing the public domain is a direct violation of the public 
trust doctrine.
140
   
 Decreasing the number of works available for use in the public domain comes with its 
own dangers, according to opponents of extension.  If works are kept out of the public domain, 
authors have less material to build upon.
141
  Also, some companies and creators suffer, since they 
have less to choose from that they can use from the public domain, therefore stifling creativity.
142
  
After the passage of CTEA, the public domain remains frozen until 2018, with no new works 
entering it.
143
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 Opponents also are suspicious of the idea that extended terms will necessarily incentivize 
authors to create new works.
144
  Their view is that it is unlikely that an author would be 
incentivized to create a copyrightable work merely because twenty or so years of additional 
protection is provided.
145
  Opponents staunchly believe that if the benefit of incentivizing authors 
does exist by extending terms, that benefit is easily outweighed by the harm to the public, 
especially with fewer additions to the public domain.
146
  
Besides the aforementioned arguments, opponents staunchly believe that copyright term 
extension is at the point where it has become unconstitutional.
147
  The plaintiffs argued this in 
Eldred, without success.
148
  Since the constitution grants a copyright owner a temporary 
monopoly, opponents believe that by continuously increasing terms, Congress is permitting a 
perpetual copyright term, which is unconstitutional.
149
  Opponents also argue that extension is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
150
  If the public domain is not growing, opponents 
argue that this is a limit on free speech, as those authors cannot use the works that potentially 
would be entering the public domain.
151
  
 In balancing the arguments of both the proponents and the opponents of extension, it is 
evident that the benefits of extension outweigh the potential pitfalls – and adhere to the basic 
goals of copyright law.  As times change, so must our laws, and with longer life expectancies and 
commercial viability of works comes the need for longer terms to continue incentivizing 
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creation.  In order to promote the all-important progress of science and the useful arts, authors 
and companies need to be adequately incentivized to create, expanding terms for longer, but 
limited, times. 
 Studies have proven that extension has previously increased the amount of new 
copyrights, thus incentivizing creation.  In 2003, a study proved that the last two major copyright 
changes before CTEA, the Copyright Act of 1976 and the 1988 Berne Convention, had 
significant effects on copyright registrations.
152
  The Berne Convention, a treaty that provided 
some international protection from copyrights, was associated with approximately a ten percent 
increase in registrations.
153
  Also, the overall increase in copyright registrations after the 1976 
Copyright Act, which extended protection to the life of the author plus fifty years, was about 
sixteen percent.
154
  While the conclusion that therefore these extension of copyright terms 
increased creativity has been refuted, it seems that any increase in copyrights can be considered 
an increase in creativity and beneficial to the public, making more works available.  Apparently, 
there is only a “thirty-eight percent chance that a law increasing copyright protection will lead to 
an increase in the number of new registrations for a single, unknown category of copyrighted 
work.”155  However, any chance of an increase in copyrights would benefit the public.  It seems 
reasonable to predict that the further expansion of terms would increase registration again – 
which supports the goal of copyright law to further the progress of the sciences and the useful 
arts.
156
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 Other studies have shown that changes in copyright law have beneficially affected the 
public’s valuation of firms that relied on copyright law.157  In a study measuring how changes in 
copyright protection changed the market value of firm equity from 1985 to 1998, it was 
determined that statutory changes and court decisions had a significant impact on equity 
returns.
158
  Furthermore, the study showed that the “legal changes broadening copyright 
protection were associated with increase in firm equity, while legal changes narrowing copyright 
protection were associated with decreases in firm equity.”159  Therefore, changes in copyright 
law had an effect on the public’s “valuation of firms that relied upon copyright law.”160  This 
ultimately benefits the public, by keeping businesses alive, aiding the economy, and making 
more works available to the public.   
 As for opponents arguing that copyright term extension is unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court has directly ruled otherwise.
161
  In Eldred, the Supreme Court stated that, “[t]he CTEA 
reflects judgments of a kind […] we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”162  The 
Court held that Congress “rationally credited protections that longer terms would encourage 
copyright holders to invest in […] their works” because of the incentives that copyright term 
extension would create.
163
  Since it has already been determined that an extended, yet limited, 
copyright term is constitutional, Congress is confirmed to have the power to do so.  Another 
extension would not indefinitely extend copyright terms – and that is the only reason that 
extension could be destroyed as unconstitutional.  Therefore, a longer extension is in the power 
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of Congress to decide upon, and the Supreme Court has already held that it will give great 
deference to Congress in this arena.
164
   
 Yet another study, conducted in 2006, proved that countries that extended the terms of 
copyright from the author’s life plus fifty years to the author’s life plus seventy years anytime 
between 1991 and 2002, saw a significant increase in movie production.
165
  This data proved that 
a relationship between copyright duration and the production of movies does exist, and that 
increasing copyright duration has a positive impact.
166
  Increased movie production, or the 
increased production of anything copyrightable, furthers the goal of copyright, and these studies 
show that increased copyright protection is an incentive for creation.
167
 
 The fact that life expectancies and the commercial viability of works increases 
demonstrates a need for the expansion of copyright, for additional incentive to create.  As life 
expectancy increases, an author’s children and grandchildren can very easily live past the 
duration of copyright protection of the author’s life plus seventy years.168  Also, modern 
technology has increased the commercial viability of works.  Companies are surviving longer, 
some becoming international conglomerates that have no foreseeable demise, and in order to 
incentivize these companies to keep creating, they need additional protection.  If a company 
whose main copyrights have existed for a long time knows their work will soon fall into the 
public domain, they would likely be less incentivized to create derivative works or more new 
works utilizing that copyright.  For example, Disney might begin rethinking their excessive 
branding utilizing Mickey Mouse if they stand to lose that copyright in 2018.  They could 
                                                 
164
 Id. at 219.  
165
 Ivan P.L. Png & Qiu-Hong Wang, Copyright Duration and the Supply of Creative Work  (Sept. 2006), available 
at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932161. 
166
 Id.   
167
 Id. 
168
 Adeyanju, supra note 4, citing Patrick H. Haggerty, The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 661 (2002).   
 24 
  
potentially start utilizing some of their other characters more prominently and stop making new 
works featuring Mickey Mouse.  Bruce Lehman, the former Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, explained to Congress, “There is ample evidence that shows that once a work falls 
into the public domain it is neither cheaper nor more widely available than most works protected 
by copyright.”169  Lehman further explained that quality copies of public domain works are not 
widely available because publishers may not want to publish a work that is in the public domain, 
fearing that they will not recoup their investment.
170
  Therefore, not only would the creator suffer 
from losing his copyright protection, but this sort of behavior harms the public, who does not get 
the benefit of these works.  While current protection does supply security for a significant 
amount of time, an increase in protection would promote progress even more, and is more in line 
with the increase in life expectancy and the commercial viability of works.   
 The threat of underuse of copyrights supports extension, due to the belief that works 
become less available to consumers when they enter the public domain.
171
  By not extending 
rights, some current copyright owners know that protection for their work is limited and they will 
be less inclined to invest the money, time, and effort into building upon their copyrights since 
they will not necessarily be able to recoup their investment costs.
172
  This harms the public, as 
some works will therefore never be created.  This also applies to works that have already been 
created.
173
  Since some works require “costly investments to maintain, produce, and distribute,” 
if authors know they cannot recoup their investment, they will not bother to invest at all.
174
  For 
example, while Disney has recouped their initial investment in creating the Mickey Mouse image 
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that is copyrighted, they perpetually utilize Mickey Mouse on products and in their theme parks, 
which is a continuous cost.  If Mickey Mouse fell into the public domain, Disney might stop 
utilizing him, thinking they would not be able to recoup expenditures, and Mickey could become 
underused, not benefitting anyone.  Allowing a work to fall into the public domain can therefore 
result in the underuse of works, which not only harms the original author, who could continue to 
profit from the work if it remained under copyright, but the public as well.   
 Besides the hazard of the general underuse of copyrights, comes the risk that copyrighted 
works will be underused in a way that limits derivative works.
175
  Professor Arthur Miller 
explains “you have to provide incentives for [producers] to produce the derivatives, the motion 
picture, the TV series, the documentary, whatever it may be.”176  This ultimately harms the 
public, by preventing progress as a result of derivative works the author could have created.   
The tarnishment of copyrights not only affects copyright holders but the public.  If a 
copyright enters the public domain and anyone can create a work with it, the public can either be 
misled into thinking the creation is the legitimate work of the author, and might consume goods 
that are not up to the quality level that they expected and the author’s reputation can be damaged.  
For example, the well-loved Christmas classic, “It’s a Wonderful Life” fell into the public 
domain in the 1980s.
177
  Television networks played poor-quality versions of the film, and 
companies sold the film on VHS tapes, using whatever shoddy-condition version of the film that 
they could find.
178
  Multiple versions of the film existed in “horrid condition,” and the film was 
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often altered by local television stations that removed parts and made ample room for 
commercials.
179
  Luckily, the film was removed from the public domain when a company 
successfully claimed that it still held the copyright.
180
  The film was thereafter digitally restored 
and played and distributed in the way it should have been, arguably benefitting the public by 
being quality entertainment.
181
  While copyright protection cannot last forever, it is reasonable 
that terms should be extended because works that are very much still in use deserve to be 
protected from tarnishment, for the sake of not only the authors, but the public as well. 
In summary, while the public domain benefits the public by providing works for authors 
to build upon and public access to older works, it is also a problem for copyrights that are not 
ready to enter the public domain.  If terms are extended for a limited time, works will all 
inevitably fall into the public domain – but after more time has passed, which better suits modern 
times.  Exploited and poorly-produced copies can be made which damages the reputation of the 
original author, and importantly, misleads the public or presents them with lesser-quality works.  
With more years of protection, comes more years that authors know they and their descendants 
will benefit from their work, which provides the incentive to create, which undoubtedly always 
benefits the public.   
VII. HOW COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN 2018 
As 2018 approaches, Congress will again need to start considering the arguments for and 
against term extensions.  Congress should recognize that to further incentivize progress and to 
reward the creativity behind original works, copyright terms should be extended.  The only limit 
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on copyright terms is that a term cannot be perpetual.
182
  The Supreme Court has clearly given 
full deference to Congress’ decisions in the past, and as terms have increased, they should 
continue to do so to accommodate copyrights.
183
 
 By additional term extensions, the intent of the Framers can be furthered, as those with 
the talent to create will be incentivized to continue crafting new and innovative works, furthering 
progress.  By permitting copyright owners to leave their legacy to future generations and 
preventing the underuse of useful works by keeping them out of the public domain for longer 
periods of time, the future of the progress of the sciences and useful arts can be protected.  By 
stopping works from entering the public domain too prematurely, where the overuse and 
exploitation of the copyright can diminish its value and steal the opportunity of the author to be 
compensated maximally, and where copyrights can be tarnished by others, authors will be 
incentivized to continue creating, benefiting themselves and the public at large.   
If Congress is disenchanted with the idea of granting another twenty-year extension to 
copyright terms, and basically replicating CTEA, there are other avenues that Congress could 
explore.  Since the upkeep of the public domain is a big concern to opponents of copyright term 
extension, perhaps the next term extension can make a compromise on how the public domain 
will be affected.  If some formalities for copyright protection were reintroduced, for example, 
requiring copyright owners to apply for and renew their copyrights, works will fall into the 
public domain after a certain period of time.  Economics scholars William Landes and Richard 
Posner agree with this position, offering evidence of low rates of renewal during past periods of 
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copyright formalities.
184
  Landes and Posner assert that less than eleven percent of the copyrights 
that were registered between 1883 and 1964 were renewed upon the end of their twenty-eight 
year term, despite the low cost of copyright renewal.
185
  By limiting a copyright term extension 
with a way to maintain the growth of the public domain, Congress can potentially appease 
opponents somewhat, promote the public good, and continue to protect those who still wish to 
retain and use their copyrights. 
Many successful companies today still make use of copyrights that have existed for 
extended periods of time and are still imperative to their business.  As aforementioned, the last 
time copyright extension was considered, the value of Disney’s copyright for Mickey Mouse was 
a whopping $8 billion in 1998.
186
  That number has grown, and the company continues to use 
Mickey on merchandise, marketing, video productions, and other products.  If Disney was to lose 
Mickey Mouse in 2018 to the public domain, there would be free reign as to who could produce 
merchandise or products using Mickey Mouse.  Inferior goods would inevitably be produced, 
and consumers might purchase them at a cheaper price, or might purchase them unknowingly, 
mistaking the goods to be authentically Disney.  This can ultimately result in lost profits for 
Disney, and can easily tarnish the quality of entertainment and merchandise for which Disney is 
known.  A company that is still putting money and work behind a copyright deserves the right to 
solely enjoy the benefits of their success.   
In order to best further the goals of copyright law, Congress should extend copyright 
protection in 2018 once again, and require copyright owners to renew their copyrights, as 
aforementioned.  A possible solution would be using the current framework, since our copyright 
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laws align nicely with those in Europe, and add on additional terms during which copyrights can 
be renewed.  Therefore, copyrights would start entering the public domain immediately, as some 
copyright owners inevitably would choose not to renew.  A plan that permits authors to renew 
their copyright every five years, for six terms, copyright owners would be given an additional 
thirty years of protection.  Since a decision of Congress in regards to copyright law must only 
pass rational basis review, an extension such as this would survive scrutiny by the court.  
Especially if renewable terms were added, thus allowing the public domain to grow every five 
years, rather than have it frozen for a block of years, such as it was as a result of CTEA.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 In 2018, Congress will be faced with the question of extending terms again or 
maintaining the current law, allowing copyrights to infiltrate the public domain as of 2019.
187
  
Proponents of extension will argue that terms can be extended, so long as they are not perpetual 
and that longer terms further incentivizes progress.  Opponents will argue that there is no right 
for a copyright to survive multiple generations, that extensions limit the public domain and the 
building upon of works, and that extending terms does not necessarily further incentivize 
authors.  To best protect current copyrights, and incentivize further creation, Congress should 
expand copyright terms within the constitutional limits.  By creating a system where formalities 
are used, and copyright owners have to renew their copyright, for a number of terms, copyright 
law would extend terms, while adding to the public domain, and staying within constitutional 
boundaries.  
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